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and consist of individuals capable of being good investors. We 
are also able to show that “the crowd” will act significantly 
more sophisticated in the situation of equity compared to 
traditional crowdfunding. Finally, we are not able to show any 
clear signs of the Social Influence Effect in our study, which 
gives further support for a sophisticated and “wise” crowd 
according to the wisdom of the crowd theory. 	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1. Introduction 
 
Developments of the financial market have proven to be a driving force of economic growth1. 
In recent years equity crowdfunding has emerged as an easy way for informal investors to 
purchase equity stakes in new ventures over the Internet. In 2011 $1.5 billion dollars were 
raised on 435 crowdfunding platforms worldwide.2  
 
Equity crowdfunding is a widely discussed and highly relevant topic. For entrepreneurs it can 
be a solution to bridge the often-present financing gap, which is often responsible for 
hampering new start-ups3. However, it remains to be seen whether the equity model will persist 
or if equity crowdfunding is too exposed to become a stable financing option. Young start-up 
companies have difficulties obtaining financing because of high information asymmetry, no 
collateral and negative cash flow4. Informal investors are usually the ones investing in risky 
start-up companies because informal investors require lower rates of return, are more likely to 
take on higher risks and have longer investment horizons5. On the one hand, equity 
crowdfunding may be a remapping and democratization of the capital market. On the other, 
equity crowdfunding may be a permanent weakening of investor protection, exposing investors 
to new problems. The question still remains: Does the crowdfunding model have the potential 
to become a viable financing alternative for entrepreneurs? 
 
Equity crowdfunding lowers transaction costs and provides a stage for entrepreneurs to exhibit 
their projects. The aggregate knowledge of the investors (also referred to as the wisdom of the 
crowd) can be an effective tool in choosing successful projects, possibly even more effective 
than traditional venture capitalists6.  This is however not enough to ensure the success of the 
equity crowdfunding model as agency conflicts and control difficulties still exist. Post 
investment actions such as governance and contracting and pre-investment actions such as 
screening are of great importance to overcome these difficulties. We argue that one important 
condition for a successful future of equity crowdfunding is the sophistication of the crowd, 
meaning that investor’s actions contain common venture capital strategies to mitigate agency 
conflicts such as screening, monitoring and governance. 
To determine if pre investment actions such as screening are sufficient, one can look at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 King, R.G. & Levine, R.,”Finance and Growth: Schumpeter might be right”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, August 1993    
2 Crowdsourcing.org, “Crowdfunding Industry Report - Market Trends, Compositions and 
Crowdfunding Platforms”, May 2012  
3	  Harrison, R. T. & Mason, C. M., ”International Perspective on the Supply on Informal Venture 
Capital”, Journal of Business Venturing 7, 459-475, 1992   
4 Cosh, A., Cumming, D. & Hughes, A., “Outside Entrepreneurial Capital”, Economic Journal 119, 
1494-1533, 2009 5	  Harrison, R. T. & Mason, C. M., ”International Perspective on the Supply on Informal Venture 
Capital” 
6 Surowiecki, J.,”The Wisdom of Crowds” (Anchor Books: New York, 2004), 4-5 
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success factors of particular projects. However, the practical problem of this approach lies in 
the difficulty of correctly measuring and comparing success between different types of 
projects. Another, more practical approach is to conduct an in-depth survey and study the 
actions taken by the crowd before and after funding a project. We have conducted just such a 
survey with the objective to analyze pre and post investment actions of the crowd. The data 
consists of 390 survey responses from crowdfunders that have made investments through 
Sweden’s first online crowdfunding platform, FundedByMe.  
 
The survey includes questions of demographic and personality type in an effort to determine 
the sophistication of the crowd. Additionally, we ask about their experience of traditional 
crowdfunding and how they would react if offered an equity stake in a project. The data is 
highly detailed although it is limited to those who have crowdfunded via FundedByMe. This 
limits the ability of our findings to be generalized, but we believe our sample is in some ways 
representative of other crowdfunders, both nationally and internationally. Another limitation of 
our study is that it soley consists of traditional crowdfunders responses to hypothetical equity 
crowdfunding scenarios because, at the time of our study, the sample of equity crowdfunders 
was too small for a quantitative analysis. Therefore, we assume that the existing crowd of 
traditional crowdfunders shares many similarities with the potential crowd of equity 
crowdfunders.  
 
To our knowledge, no previous empirical studies of equity crowdfunding in Sweden have been 
realized, and few studies on the subject have been carried out internationally. We aim to 
establish whether or not “the crowd” is capable of smart investment in order to estimate the 
future chance of success for the equity crowdfunding model. A secondary purpose of this paper 
is to contribute insights to promote the development of the equity crowdfunding model.  
 
Our analysis is based on three theories of investment, the first of which concerns information 
asymmetry. According to theory, information asymmetry leads to adverse selection, free riding 
and moral hazard7. Secondly is the principal-agent theory, which explains the effect of 
differing incentives of the entrepreneur (agent) and the investor (principal)8. Thirdly, the 
traditional corporate governance theory proposes actions such as screening and monitoring to 
mitigate these control problems9. Because "the crowd” is exposed to control difficulties and 
asymmetric information, rationality suggests that equity crowdfunding works only if “the 
crowd” takes similar actions to mitigate these problems. Additionally, the wisdom of the crowd 
effect claims that as long as "the crowd" is diverse enough it will act smarter as a collective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Akerlof, G.A.,”The Market for Lemmons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3 pp. 488-500, Oxford University Press, August 1970 
8 Eisenhardt, K. M.,“Agency Theory: An Assessment and a Review”, The Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 pp. 57-74, January 1989 
9 Kaplan, S.N. & Strömberg P., “Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and 
Monitoring”, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Vol. 91 NO.2, 2011 
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than as individuals10. However, this effect only works as long as “the crowd” is not subjected 
to the social influence effect, which narrows the diversity of opinion and therefore reduces the 
wisdom of the crowd as a whole11. Therefore, a crowd capable of good investment consists of 
sophisticated investors and of investors not adversely affected by the social influence effect. 
We aim to answer three questions: 
 
I. How sophisticated are the people in “the crowd”? 
II. Does “the crowd” act sophisticated in traditional crowdfunding?  
III. Will “the crowd” act more sophisticated in equity crowdfunding? 
 
If one believes in the potential success of the crowdfunding model one would expect a crowd 
of sophisticated people, a sophisticated investment process, and that expert are more active 
than non-experts. According to our study this is not particularly true in traditional 
crowdfunding but tends to be more true in equity crowdfunding. In order for equity crowd 
funding to be a viable model, not only does “the crowd” need to act sophisticated but 
crowdfunding platforms also need to provide more company information in order to facilitate 
pre investment actions. Another concern is the problem of free riding and weak investor 
protection, which can be mitigated by limiting the number of investors and maintaining strong, 
enforceable contracts.12 
 
Our study contributes with new insights about the characteristics of "the crowd" that did not 
exist in prior crowdfunding literature. It is the first study of equity crowdfunding in Sweden 
from a finance perspective and contributes information about necessary conditions for the 
success of the equity crowdfunding model.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section two provides an introduction and overview of the 
crowdfunding phenomenon and puts traditional and equity crowdfunding in the context of 
other entrepreneurial finance alternatives. We also review challenging and supporting theories 
and provide a theoretical background to our hypothesis development. Section three explains 
our methodology, and in section four we review our research results. In section five we discuss 
those results, in section six we give some concluding remarks and, finally, in section seven we 
give some suggestions for future research.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Surowiecki, J.,”The Wisdom of Crowds” (Anchor Books: New York, 2004), 1-4	  
11 Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F. & Helbing, D., “How social influence can undermine the                  
wisdom of the crowd effect”, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, April 13, 2011  
12 Pasour, Jr., E.C.,“The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention”, North Carolina State 
University, The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. V, No. 4, 1981 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Crowdfunding Overview 	  
2.1.1 Traditional Crowdfunding 
The definition of crowdfunding by the Oxford University dictionary is:  
 
“The practice of funding a project or venture by raising many small amounts 
of money from a large number of people, typically via the Internet.”13  
 
There are two types of crowdfunding: Traditional Crowdfunding (also called classic 
crowdfunding) and Equity Crowdfunding. Traditional crowdfunding includes lending based, 
donation based, and reward based crowdfunding. The two categories differ in only one aspect: 
what the funder receives in return for funding a project. For traditional crowdfunding it can be 
anything from a simple letter of gratitude to a reward item, but in equity crowdfunding, the 
investor receives an equity stake in the project. Traditional crowdfunding works best for 
projects that easily arouse and engage people, such as projects dealing with environmental 
issues, human rights and personal believes. The total number of crowdfunding platforms is on 
the rise and by the end of 2012 there were 452 crowdfunding platforms in the world that 
together helped raise over $1.5 billion in 2011.14  
 
It is easy to understand the widespread use and popularity of crowdfunding. With little effort, 
anyone in need of finance can reach out to a crowd of possible financiers while not having to 
give up control rights. For instance, a film maker utilizing crowdfunding can retain control of 
casting decisions and the film's final cut15. Crowdfunding is also frequently used to raise 
money for charity, art projects, and political campaigns. In the year 2010, 65.000 people 
helped raise $3.000.000 to support 4 000 artists from a crowdfunding platform called 
Sellaband.16 By turning to "the crowd", entrepreneurs and artists are able to retain their 
entrepreneurial and artistic freedom. Crowdfunding allows them to pursue their vision without 
the meddling of private investors or financial intermediates. It is a fast and easy way to 
overcome the hindrance of geographical distance between entrepreneurs and financiers and is 
an opportunity for anyone, anywhere seeking monetary support for a new venture or idea.17  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Oxford Dictionaries, “Crowdfunding”, www.oxforddictionaries.com, 2013	  
14 Crowdsourcing.org, “Crowdfunding Industry Report - Market Trends, Compositions and 
Crowdfunding Platforms”, www.crowdsourcing.org, May 2012	  
15 Crowdsourcing.org, ”Zack Braff’s Crowdfunded film passes $1Million Mark”, 
www.crowdsourcing.org, April 24, 2013 
16 Schwienbacher, A. & Larralde, B., ”Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures”, 2010, 
(working paper)	  
17 Crowdsourcing.org, ”Zack Braff’s Crowdfunded film passes $1Million Mark”, 
www.crowdsourcing.org, April 24, 2013 
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In an article by Ethan Mollick, who analysed the determinants of success and failures in 
crowdfunding, he states that most successfully funded entrepreneurs delivered their goods with 
an average delay of one month. In spite on this fact, "the crowd" seemed overall to be good at 
picking entrepreneurs who try to fulfill their commitment to “the crowd”.18 In other words, 
today’s limited research of crowdfunding show the traditional crowdfunding model is 
effective, with only minor flaws. 
 
2.1.2 Equity Crowdfunding 
In 2006 traditional crowdfunding developed into equity crowdfunding and a new type of 
crowdfunding emerged19. This is the definition of equity crowdfunding according to an article 
by Ahlers et al.: 
 
“Equity crowdfunding is a method of financing whereby an entrepreneur sells 
equity or equity-like shares in a company to a group of (small) investors 
through an open call for funding on Internet-based platforms”20 
 
Equity crowdfunding emerged because of a need for entrepreneurial finance. Entrepreneurship 
is frequently discussed topic today because of the belief that an increased amount of 
entrepreneurial activity will lead to higher economic growth and further development of 
societies21. The development and successfulness of the equity crowdfunding model is therefore 
important from a governmental point of view, which in part accounts for the model’s on-going 
development.  
  
In Sweden, equity crowdfunding began in April 2011 with a platform called FundedByMe22. 
Crowdfunding platforms profit by charging a transaction fee, which is a percentage taken out 
of the funds a project raises. The percentage ranges from 2-25 % and is based on a calculation 
of total funds raised.23 Because equity crowdfunding is new in Sweden, one would have to 
look to foreign equity crowdfunding sites for statistics. Crowdcube, a British equity 
crowdfunding platform, reports the average number of investors per project to be 66, and the 
average investment per investor to be $3.000. Since their start in 2011, Crowdcube has closed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mollick, E., “The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: Determinants of Success and Failures”, The Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania, 2012, (working paper)	  
19 FundedByMe,”Frequently Asked Questions”, www.fundedbyme.com, February 2011	  
20 Ahlers, K.C.G, Cumming, D., Günter, C. & Schweizer, D., ”Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding”, 
2012, (working paper)	  
21 Larroulet, C. & Couyoumdjian, J.P., “Entrepreneurship and Growth – A Latin American Paradox?”, 
The Independent Review, 2009	  
22 allabolag.se, ”FundedByMe Crowdfunding Sweden Aktiebolag”, www.allabolag.se, April 22, 2013	  
23 Crowdsourcing.org, “Crowdfunding Industry Report - Market Trends, Compositions and 
Crowdfunding Platforms”, May 2012	  
	   9 
44 equity rounds, raising $10 million in total.24 
 
Traditionally in Sweden companies are only allowed to issue equity through the stock market 
but the Swedish Companies Act includes a loophole that allows equity crowdfunding platforms 
to operate legally. The law enables entrepreneurs to receive funding by issuing equity on 
crowdfunding platforms without going public on the stock market. The legal constraint for 
issuing equity via Internet in Sweden lies at a maximum number of 200 investors or 200 shares 
per project and that investors are obligated to report an interest during a pre investment 
round.25 According to the Swedish Companies Act (2005:812)26: 
 
“A private company or a shareholder in such a company may not, through 
advertising, attempt to sell shares or subscription rights in the company or 
debentures or warrants issued by the company.” 
 
It further states,  
 
“The aforesaid shall not, however, apply where the offer is directed solely to 
a group of persons who have previously given notice of interest in such 
offers and where no more than 200 trading units are offered.” 
 
This is important, because what enables equity crowdfunding to operate legally in Sweden is 
that investors first have to report an interest to invest during a “pre round”. The entrepreneur 
then selects and invites investors to participate in the “open round”. It is not until the “open 
round” stage that the reported interest is turned into a real transfer of cash in return for an 
equity stake in the company. FundedByMe does not handle any contracts and only exists to 
provide a market place for investors and entrepreneurs to meet27. All contracts between the 
investor and entrepreneur are handled outside the platform. FundedByMe is therefore protected 
from all legal responsibility in the contract between the entrepreneur and the investors. 
 
The process from an investor’s perspective engaged in equity crowdfunding in Sweden begins 
with the person visiting the website and reviewing a wide selection of companies and projects 
to invest in. Typically, the information available is limited and only regards the business 
concept as a whole. It may include a company overview, basic team and company information, 
and a collection of documents, such as a shareholder's agreement.28   However, much pertinent 
information is missing. Investors typically lack access to a cash flow analysis, cost estimates, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Tysklind, J., Co-founder of Crowdcube Sweden, (Crowdfunding seminar), Malmo, May 16, 2013 
25 Lagen.nu,”Aktiebolagslag”, www.lagen.nu, 2005	  
26 FundedByMe,”Frequently Asked Questions”, www.fundedbyme.com, February 2011	  
27 Ibid	  
28 Ibid 
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Outside platform  
	  	  	  	  	  
On platform  
competitor analysis, a valuation of any kind, and there is no information about potential risks 
to the company or project.  
 
By reporting an interest to invest during a so-called “pre-round”, the investor complies with the 
Swedish Companies Act. The entrepreneur then selects and reviews all potential investors and 
chooses to reject those that he or she does not see fit, a decision which is based on the amount 
of the reported interest. Once the project owner has selected the investors, they receive an 
invitation to participate in the open-round to invest at a pre-specified company value based on 
the reported interest. Interested investors report a further interest by signing a letter of intent 
with a digital signature. The investors have to sign this contract and wait until the round is 
closed for the investment pledge to be valid.29  
 	    
Figure 2.1.2: Equity crowdfunding process - FundedByMe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meanwhile equity crowdfunding is also developing in other parts of the world. In April of 
2012 President Obama signed the JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups act), which 
allows the use of crowdfunding to raise equity for new startups in the United States. The aim 
of the act was foremost to create new jobs in the struggling economy and address the number 
of declining IPOs, but also to provide an additional tool for entrepreneurs to bypass banks and 
other financial institutions.30  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 FundedByMe,”Frequently Asked Questions”, www.fundedbyme.com, February 2011 
30 The Economist,“Uncuffing capitalism”, The Economist, March 31, 2012 
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The issue whether the loophole enabling equity crowdfunding to operate legally in Sweden is a 
reduction of investor protection is not widely debated domestically but has been a concern to 
those who take a stand against the passing of the JOBS Act in the United States. The Securities 
Act of 1933 and 1934 made it illegal for companies to offer shares to the public without 
registering a public offering with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The purpose 
was to protect investors from investing in illegitimate companies, a protection which does not 
exists under equity crowdfunding.31 Thus, the responsibility rests on the shoulders of "the 
crowd" who may or may not consist of people capable of good investment. In contrast, those in 
favour of the JOBS Act argue that firms spend more time complying with regulation than 
developing new products32. From this perspective equity crowdfunding is a powerful tool of 
lowering the overall financing transaction costs.  
 
The crowdfunding industry report is the first comprehensive report on the global crowdfunding 
industry. The report is provided by MassolutionTM and is based on a crowdfunding industry 
survey, which was conducted in the first quarter of 2012. According to the crowdfunding 
industry report the reward-based crowdfunding industry is considered to be the largest while 
the equity-based industry is the fastest growing sector. The growth of equity crowdfunding in 
2012 was 114%. The growth was mainly driven by the passing of the JOBS Act in the United 
States and by the increased number crowdfunding platforms in Europe.33 By April of 2012 
there were 39 crowdfunding platforms offering equity crowdfunding to the world. In 2011, the 
total crowdfunding volume reached $88 million dollars, 93 % of which were raised on 
platforms in Ireland, Australia, France and the UK. As the design of equity crowdfunding 
platforms is dependent on the security regulations in each country the designs and business 
models each platform varies.34  
 
2.1.3 Equity Crowdfunding in an Entrepreneurial Finance Context 
The process of developing a venture is typically divided into eight stages: seed-stage, start-up, 
early development, expansion, profitable or cash poor, rapid growth, bridge and finally the 
harvest stage. The most common financing alternatives for entrepreneurs in the start-up or 
early development phase are: business angels, venture capital firms or government funding.35  
 
While equity crowdfunding is about seeking smaller amounts of external capital from many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Best, J., Neiss, S., Stralser, S. & L. Fleming., “How Big Will the Debt and Equity Crowdfunding 
Investment Market Be? Comparisons, Assumptions, and Estimates”, University of California, Berkeley, 
January, 2013	  
32 The Economist,“Uncuffing capitalism”, The Economist, March 31, 2012 
33 Crowdsourcing.org, “Crowdfunding Industry Report - Market Trends, Compositions and 
Crowdfunding Platforms”, May 2012	  
34 Ahlers, K.C.G, et al., ”Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 2012, (working paper)  
35 Ogden, J.P. & O’Conner, P.F., ”Advanced Corpoprate Finance, Policies and Strategies” (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 361 	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small investors, venture finance is about raising larger amounts of capital from relatively few 
investors36. Young, high growth start-up companies lacking assets or profits usually seek 
financing from venture capital firms or business angels but venture or angel financing is not 
widely available and rejections are very common37.  
 
According to research, venture capital firms are more efficient, have larger networks and also 
perform more intense pre-investment screening than business angels. When it comes to 
monitoring actions during the entrepreneurial process, business angels show more interest, but 
when it comes to designing the contracts, venture capital firms are more controlling.  In 
conclusion, business angels often invest with the motivation of becoming actively for the 
satisfaction of giving back to the entrepreneurial community, whereas venture capital firms 
invest primarily to earn a steady return. Another difference is the relative size of a business 
angel’s investment, which is on average smaller than investments made by venture capital 
firms.38 
 
The market for individual equity investments into private companies is large but has few 
participants. Comparing venture capital investment to business angels, angels are harder to find 
but are less expensive and less time consuming.39  By providing a market place for high risk 
financing in early-stage companies, seed capital becomes more available to entrepreneurs that 
are no longer limited by the entrepreneurs' network. Equity crowdfunding is believed to 
increase the number of business angel investors in the United States from 60,000 to 6 million, 
making it substantially easier for entrepreneurs to raise seed capital40. The cost of participating 
in the equity crowdfunding market is also lower, measured both in time and money. 
Crowdfunding has the potential to curb high participation costs by enabling more people to 
participate in the market more easily and at lower cost. According to a private equity investor, 
by allowing companies to raise money more efficiently, crowdfunding will save the 
entrepreneur’s most valuable resource: time, thereby allowing them to spend more of it on the 
project rather than pursuing investment.41 However, having many small equity holders can be a 
burden as for a business having to give on-going information about their project, processing 
feedback and drawing up contracts. This can have the opposite effect and interfere with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T. & Schweinbacher, A., “Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd”, 
2012, (working paper)	  
37 Cosh, A., Cumming D. & Hughes, A., “Outside Entrepreneurial Capital” 
38 Osnabrugge, V. M.”A comparison of business angel and venture capitalist investment procedures: An 
agency theory-based analysis, Venture Capital”, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 
2:2, 91-109, 2000  
39 Freear, J., Sohl, J.E. & Wetzel, W.E., ”Angels: Personal Investors in the Venture Capital Market”, 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development: An International Journal Vol. 7, Issue 1, 1995  
40 Paolini, G., ”SEC Stalls Equity Crowdfunding… Again”, Columbia Business Law Review, 2013 
41 Calbeck, R., “The Disruptive Power of Equity Crowdfunding”, Forbes, January 13, 2013   
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entrepreneur’s daily management of their business.42  
 
Another drawback of having many small investors instead of a few large investors is the lack 
of support and strategic advice, something venture capitalist or business angels often 
contribute. It is often highly valuable for start-up companies to have access to the competence 
of business angels or venture capitalists for strategic advice, mentorship, and access to a larger 
network.43 Equity crowdfunding is also believed to be associated with low liquidity and few 
exit opportunities. Nelson Gray, a British business angel, believes equity crowdfunding 
investors run a risk of being “locked in” and not finding an investor that is willing to buy out 
“the crowd”.  One proposed reason is the administrative burden of organizing a buyout from a 
large group of shareholders. In the UK, another issue is that under UK tax law there is no tax 
relief from purchasing already existing shares.44 Equity crowdfunding investors will likely 
view the difficulties of exiting a deal as a barrier to entering the market. Additionally, if the 
entrepreneurs in a latter stage want to receive more finance from a venture capital firm or 
business angel potential ownership conflicts could arise. According to a Swedish venture 
capitalist, venture capital firms are less interested in investing in a project with many existing 
owners because of the increased risk of conflict.45 
 
 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Heander, P., Venture Capitalist; ALMI, (Crowdfunding seminar), Malmo, May 16, 2013	  
43 Casamatta, C., ” Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists”, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVIII, No 5, October 2003 
44 Nelson, G.,“Equity Crowdfunding – Thanks, But No”, www.nelsongray.com, January 2013	  
45 Heander, P., Venture Capitalist; ALMI, (Crowdfunding seminar), Malmo, May 16, 2013  
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2.2 Theoretical Support and Challenges 
 
2.2.1 Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Free Rider Problem 
On a typical equity crowdfunding platform, the amount of information available to investors is 
limited. Compared to the stock market or in venture capital negotiations, entrepreneurs are less 
regulated to disclose information. Additionally, equity crowdfunding platforms are believed to 
attract relatively unsophisticated investors incapable of evaluating information 
appropriately when compared to venture capitalists.46  The lack of an informative competitive 
analysis or disclosure of potential dilution in the near or distant future will make it extremely 
difficult for any crowd, wise or unwise, to correctly value or determine the potential 
successfulness of a project. A further problem for "the crowd" is to validate the reliability of 
the given information. 
 
Because of the amount of asymmetric information on equity crowdfunding platforms, “the 
crowd” is subjected to several moral hazard problems. In an article by Paul Krugman moral 
hazard is defined as: 
 
“Any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk 
to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.”47 
 
The leading moral hazard is the risk of unscrupulous entrepreneurs taking advantage of the 
disperse crowd and filing for bankruptcy soon after receiving funding or allocating funds for 
other purposes other than the project. This risk is particularly high if the platform is open to 
anyone without background checks. Another potential moral hazard occurs if entrepreneurs 
value the equity inaccurately. In other types of seed-stage financing, the investors are fewer 
and have access to more information than what is available to “the crowd” on an equity 
crowdfunding platform. In the situation of a venture capitalist or business angel negotiation, 
the investors can make their own valuation to put in contrast to the entrepreneur’s valuation. 
With equity crowdfunding, the investors have less of an opportunity to price the company and 
thus have to rely on the price offered by the entrepreneur.  
 
A third potential moral hazard lies in risk tolerance differences between entrepreneur and 
investor. Because the entrepreneur is less governed and monitored than in a typical investment 
relationship, they may take on more risk than "the crowd" is willing to pay for. This risk is 
higher in crowdfunding because "the crowd" has less incentive to actively govern and monitor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Schwienbacher, A. & Larralde, B., “Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures” 	  
47 Krugman, P., “The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008” (New York City: W.W 
Norton & Company, 2009), 63 	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the entrepreneur. According to Mancur Olson there exists a faulty assumption that a group of 
people with a shared common interest will act towards realizing that interest based on the 
premise that they are rational, self-serving and utility maximizing individuals48. The group of 
equity crowdfunding investors may share a common interest in monitoring and governing the 
entrepreneur, but may lack the incentives to do so because no individual investor is prepared to 
bare the costs of monitoring and governance. The root of this problem, also is referred to as the 
free rider problem, is that monitoring and governance is a non-excludable part of this process 
or a “public good”.49   
 
Another problem stemming from asymmetric information is that of adverse selection. Any 
individual is allowed to offer equity stakes on an equity crowdfunding platform with little or 
no screening conducted by the platforms. Therefore, equity crowdfunding investors may be 
exposed to an adverse selection of projects. In his classic paper on adverse selection George 
Akerlof describes the “bad lemons” problem as an instance where high information asymmetry 
pushes high quality projects out of the market to the extent that only low quality projects, or 
“bad lemons” are left.50 If the entrepreneur is unable to effectively signal the quality of their 
project and "the crowd" is therefore unable to discern between high and low quality, high 
quality entrepreneurs will abandon the market because “the crowd” is unwilling to give the 
entrepreneurs a fair price for a share of the company. While the apparent solution to this 
problem is that crowdfunding platforms provide an initial screening of projects, many 
crowdfunding business models merely function as a market place, and do therefore not take 
any responsibility for controlling the quality of projects. If these problems are not 
addressed, according to Akerlof’s bad lemon theory, the market of high quality projects on a 
crowdfunding platform will be depleted.51  
 
Lowering the level of asymmetric information would help reduce all of the above-mentioned 
problems52. In the case of equity crowdfunding the level of asymmetric information is, among 
other factors, dependent on the actions of the crowd. If the crowd screens and monitors 
projects or if platforms provide entrepreneurs with ways to effectively signal the quality of the 
project, the level of asymmetric information could be reduced, and the effects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard on the market lessened. This would in turn lead a more promising 
future for the equity crowdfunding model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Olson M., “The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and The Theory of Groups” (Harvard 
University Press: United States, 1971 [1965]), 9-16	  
49 Pasour, Jr. E.C.,“The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention”	  
50 Akerlof, G.A.,”The Market for Lemmons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”	  
51 Ibid	  
52 Ibid	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2.2.2 Principal - Agency Conflicts  
According to theory, there are two agency conflicts within a typical firm: one between the 
owners and the manager and one between the owners and the debt holders. Principal-agency 
conflicts become apparent when the incentives of the agent and the principal differ and when 
the principal is unable to control the agent. A related principal agent conflict is when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk.53 
 
The problem of principal agent conflicts in equity crowdfunding is evident in that it is difficult 
for the entrepreneur to control the amount of funding that they are given by "the crowd". Often 
the amount of funding received is more or less than expected54. If an entrepreneur receives 
more funds than asked for, it may lower incentives to work effectively and could lead to waste 
or overly risky business decisions55.  
 
Venture capitalists and business angels specialize in young, early-phase and high-risk 
companies and invest in return for equity stakes. The investment horizon is typically very long 
and the equity stake highly illiquid, which makes it comparable to equity crowdfunding.56 In an 
article by Kaplan & Strömberg they present evidence that shows the most commonly used 
actions by venture capitalists to mitigate principal-agent conflicts are sophisticated contracting, 
pre investment screening and post investment monitoring and advising. Before a deal is 
completed the venture capitalists screen the projects by examining the business plan, liquidity 
and try to assess the overall future performance of the project by performing due diligence. In 
addition to keeping a short leash on the entrepreneur, it is also important for venture capitalists 
to have strong, enforceable contracts to protect their investment. Finally, a way for venture 
capitalists to increase the chances of success is to actively get involved in the project by 
monitoring, governing or in other ways assisting in the project.57 
 
If we apply these assumptions to equity crowdfunding the investor has three possible actions to 
restrict the entrepreneur from taking actions that are not in line with the interest of the investor. 
The first action is to create a strong, enforceable contract between the investor and the 
entrepreneur. The possibility for an equity crowdfunding investor to effectively secure their 
investment may vary since it rests on the legal expertise they consult after the completion of an 
investment round58. However, according to Ola Sellert, a legal expert with special knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Eisenhardt, K. M.,“Agency Theory: An Assessment and a Review”	  
54 Collins, L. & Pierrakis, Y., ”The Venture Crowd Report, Crowdfundig Equity, Investment Into 
Business”, Nesta, www.nesta.org.uk, July 2012	  
55 Eisenhardt, K. M.,“Agency Theory: An Assessment and a Review” 
56 Ogden, J.P. & O’Conner, P.F.”Advanced Corpoprate Finance, Policies and Strategies” (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2003), 365	  
57 Klonowski, D.,”The Venture Capital Investment Process” (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 25-41	  
58 FundedByMe,”Frequently Asked Questions”, www.fundedbyme.com, February 2011	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about Swedish liquidation rights, a standard equity crowdfunding shareholders agreement lacks 
sufficient investor protection. Minority rights, intellectual property rights, exit opportunities 
and voting rights are only vaguely discussed or not discussed at all.59 Because venture 
capitalists have more money than time to invest in a particular project and spend a significant 
amount of time evaluating and screening before investing it is clear that screening is 
considered to be a valuable action to mitigate principal agent conflicts60. The second action, 
pre-investment screening, is limited by the information provided by the entrepreneur. The third 
action, monitoring and governing the project can also be limited by size of "the crowd" due to 
free riding61. These incapabilities of monitoring and controlling the entrepreneur contribute to 
the overall riskiness of equity crowdfunding.  
 
The future of the equity crowdfunding model is partially dependent on the existence of 
economic incentives to screen and monitor project initiators. Because the invested amounts are 
relatively smaller in crowdfunding compared to other sources of seed capital, crowdfunding is 
naturally exposed to control difficulties and principal-agent problems62.  
 
2.2.3 Wisdom of the Crowd vs. Social Influence Effect 
There has been a great deal of research on the subject of “the power of the few versus the 
wisdom of the crowd”, as put in one article by Kittur et al.63. The "wisdom of the crowd effect" 
applies when a group’s accumulated knowledge is as good or in some cases even greater than 
the knowledge of individuals within the same group, assuming that the opinions within the 
crowd are sufficiently diverse64. This effect can be seen in the stock market, quiz shows and 
political elections65. The wisdom of the crowd effect could mean a large crowd of investors is 
better at picking successful projects than a smaller group of informal investors.   
 
Contrary to the popular theory of the wisdom of the crowd is the “social influence effect” that 
is said to have a negative impact on the wisdom of the crowd. Previous scientific experiments 
have shown individuals influence each other’s decisions on which books, music and movies to 
buy66. Lorentz et al. have shown the influence of others, or herding behavior, narrows the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Sellert, O., Trustee, (Official) Receiver, Discussion on equity crowdfunding investor protection, May 
13, 2013 
60 Kaplan, S.N. & Strömberg, P., “Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and 
Monitoring”	  
61 Pasour, Jr. E.C.,“The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention” 
62 Tysklind, J., Co-founder of Crowdcube Sweden, (Crowdfunding seminar), Malmo, May 16, 2013 
63 Kittur, A., Pendleton Bongwon Suh, E.C.B. & Mytkowicz T., ”Power of the Few vs. Wisdom of the 
Crowd: Wikipedia and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie”, www.chi2013.acm.org, 2007 
64 Surowiecki, J.,”The Wisdom of Crowds” (Anchor Books: New York, 2004), 4-5 
65 Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F. & Helbing, D., “How social influence can undermine the                  
wisdom of the crowd effect”	  
66 Salganik, M.J. & Watts, D.J., ”Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-fulfilling 
Prophecies in an Artificial Cultural Market”, Social Psychology Quarterly, 71: 338, American 
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diversity of opinions and thereby reduce the wisdom of the crowd as a whole67. This theory 
relates to crowdfunding where the social network of the entrepreneur has proven to be one of 
the most critical success factors of successfully funded projects.  In other words, the size of the 
entrepreneur’s social network, for example measured in number of Facebook friends, has 
shown to be equally important as the underlying quality of the project.68  
 
Applying the wisdom of the crowd theory to equity crowdfunding, a disperse crowd may be 
better than traditional venture capitalists at picking successful projects. However, if members 
of “the crowd” take other members investment decisions into consideration and are under the 
impression that they are more knowledgeable, “the crowd” may be exposed to the social 
influence effect, also referred to as herd behavior69.  
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2.3 Hypothesis Development 	  
2.3.1 Can “The Crowd” do it as well or even better?  
In this paper we aim to describe "the crowd" and to determine whether it takes the same 
actions as a traditional venture capitalist before and after investing in a project in order to 
minimize agency conflicts. Inspired by a large number of research papers on the most common 
agency conflicts in seed-stage finance and the most commonly used methods to overcome 
these difficulties, we will investigate whether these methods will be used by a potential crowd 
of equity crowdfunding investors, an issue which has much bearing on whether there is a 
future for the equity crowdfunding model.  
 
Our first research question is whether “the crowd” consists of sophisticated people. Our second 
research question is whether the crowd acts as sophisticated investors (if “the crowd” screens, 
monitors or governs projects) in traditional crowdfunding. If they do “the crowd” of traditional 
crowdfunding investors may generally be capable of good investment. Our third research 
question is: Would "the crowd" screen or monitor more if offered an equity stake in the 
project? If not, “the crowd” may be exposed to an adverse selection of projects. In this case the 
equity crowdfunding model has a lesser chance of survival.  
 
2.3.2 Social Influence and Wisdom of the Crowd Effect – FundedByMe 
We attempted to measure the social influence and "wisdom of the crowd effect" by asking “the 
crowd” how much their decision to invest in the project was affected by the investment 
decisions of others. Additionally, we asked if they believed themselves to be less or more 
knowledgeable about the project compared to other investors. If they do not believe other 
investors to be more knowledgeable about the project and do not infer the quality of the project 
from the number of investors investing before them, “the crowd” may not be subjected to the 
social influence effect and can therefore be considered capable of good investment.  
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3. Data and Empirical Strategy 	  
3.1 Research Approach  	  
We chose a quantitative, cross-sectional study methodology to capture the variability among 
traditional crowdfunders in Sweden. According to Backman a quantitative method is used 
when the observations are numerical or can be transformed to numerical observations70. A 
benefit of this methodology is that we are able to examine the crowdfunding phenomenon at a 
specific point in time. Our research approach is deductive since we formulate hypothesis based 
on existing literature and then use empirical results to confirm or reject our hypothesis.71  
 
3.2 Survey Process  	  
In order to gather information about the characteristics, pre and post investment actions of the 
crowd we constructed a survey based on traditional corporate governance theories and 
established survey design literature72. Consisting of 30 multiple-choice questions, the aim of 
the survey was to collect four types of information: 1) demographic description of “the crowd”, 
2) previous experiences of traditional crowdfunding, 3) openness to and actions in the case of 
equity crowdfunding and last but not least 4) optimism, risk-taking, level of trust and 
numeracy of the crowd.  
 
More specifically, the first section covers demographic variables such as age, sex, and 
educational background. The second part covers “the crowd’s” experience with traditional 
crowdfunding. We asked about their main motives, if they felt satisfied afterwards and if they 
have expertise or previous experience from the same field as the project they invested in. We 
also asked a series of questions regarding the actions they took before and after investing in a 
project to determine whether the crowd screened or monitored project initiators. To determine 
whether the crowd is subjected to social influence we added two questions about how many 
had funded before them and if they were under the impression that the others were more 
knowledgeable than themselves. In the third part we asked about how they would think and 
react if offered an equity stake in a project. We also asked questions to determine if they would 
screen or monitor more as project owners than as traditional funders as in traditional 
crowdfunding. At the end of part two we provided an introduction to part three explaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Backman, J., ”Rapporter och uppsatser” (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2008), 33	  
71 Bryman, A., & Bell, E., “Företagsekonomiska forskningsmetoder” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 23	  
72 Dahmström, K., “Från datainsamling till rapport” (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2005), 123-145	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what “equity” is and asked the respondent to imagine him or herself engaging in equity 
crowdfunding. The final part is a series of questions concerning levels of trust, risk attitude and 
problem solving ability to test how trusting, risk-taking and clever the crowd is. The 
personality type questions were taken from the appendix of a published article with the aim of 
determining if women have a less entrepreneurial personality73. We formulated the remaining 
questions in collaboration with our supervisor and a professor in statistics.  
 
3.3 Sample Description and Definition of Variables 	  
We have two different sources of data. FundedByMe provided us with a log of traditional 
crowdfunders, containing information about funded amounts. Our other source of data is our 
survey. The survey was sent out by email to 2931 traditional crowdfunders who visited the 
same crowdfunding platform in the period of June 2012 to March 2013 to fund projects. In the 
introduction to the email we explained the purpose of our research and stated that all individual 
responses would be kept anonymous and only reported in aggregated form. The data was 
collected over a two-week period. Our survey sample consists of 390 complete survey 
responses, which were collected using an Internet based survey tool called Survey Monkey74. 
The response rate was 13.3 % and the result from our demographic questions show that the 
majority of the survey respondents are males with an average age of 38 years.  
 
Table 3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To take advantage of the benefits of using a quantitative method we transformed the collected 
survey data into numerical observations by creating new dichotomous variables of all survey 
responses. A drawback of transforming all data into dummy variables is that relevant 
information might be lost. However, we chose this method to facilitate interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients. Additionally, we merged questions that were designed to capture the 
same type of information. For instance, we merged two questions designed to capture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Bengtsson, O., Sanandaji, T.  & Johannesson, M., ”Do Women have less of a Entrepreneurial 
Personality?”, October 3, 2012, (Working paper)	  
74 Survey Monkey, www.surveymonkey.com, 2013  
Category (% of participants)
Male 62
Age 
20 and younger 1.8
21 to 30 23.9
31 to 40 36.8
41 to 50 17.9
50 and over 19.5
Funded more than one time 6.4
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numeracy of the crowd into one dummy variable. We repeated the process with questions 
regarding expertise, monitoring, trust and questions designed to imply social influence.  
To test our hypothesis: 
 
I. How sophisticated are the people in “the crowd”? 
II. Does “the crowd” act sophisticated in traditional crowdfunding?  
III. Will “the crowd” act more sophisticated in equity crowdfunding? 
 
We defined and sorted the variables into groups of independent and dependent variables. We 
also divided the independent variables into two further groups: one with variables explaining 
sophistication and another with the remaining independent variables.  
 
Table 3.3.2 Definition of variables 
 
Dependent variables 	  	    
Monitoring/MonitoringEQ  Actions including following up and requesting 
information about results after investing in both 
traditional and equity crowdfunding 
 
Time/TimeEQ  
 
Time spent evaluating and conducting background 
checks before funding a project in traditional and 
equity crowdfunding 
 
Contacted 
 
GovernanceEQ  
 
Contacting the project initiator before investing 
(traditional crowdfunding) 
 
Open to being actively involved in the project after 
funding (equity crowdfunding) 
 
WOTC  
 
 
 
OpenessToEQ 
 
 
MoralHazard 
 
 
SizeMatter 
 
 
ReceiveBack 
 
 
MeanAmount 
 
Influenced by how many had invested before them 
and presume other members of the crowd to be 
more knowledgeable (traditional crowdfunding) 
 
More prone to invest if offered an equity stake in 
return (equity crowdfunding) 
 
Conscious of the risk that the project initiator may 
be lying (traditional crowdfunding) 
 
Concerned with receiving a fair or a large share of 
equity as possible (equity crowdfunding) 
 
Main motive is to receive something in return 
(traditional crowdfunding) 
 
Mean funded amount (traditional crowdfunding)  	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Independent variables explaining sophistication	  	    
Numeracy Correctly answered both questions designed to 
capture numeracy 
 
Entrepreneur  
 
Have started at least one company in the past 
Expertise  Better at determining the quality of the project 
based on expertise or prior experience. To be 
classified as an expert respondents only had to 
answer yes to one of these questions 
 
Investor 
 
Have invested in private companies in the past 
HighEdu  Holding a university degree, three years or more 
 	  
Other independent variables	  	    
RiskLover  Reported a 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 to either of 
one two questions concerning risk 
Optimism  Believe the economic situation in Sweden will be 
much or marginally better in 12 months  
HihTrust  Reported a 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5 to either of 
two questions concerning trust 
Man Male 
Age  Numeric 
Currency  SEK 	  
3.4 Estimation Techniques  
	  
To analyze the sophistication and the overall characteristics of “the crowd” we used summary 
statistics of descriptive variables. After transforming the responses into dummy variables we 
ran probit regressions to examine the variables affecting various control actions such as 
screening, monitoring and governance and to see whether sophisticated investors are more 
active. We ran each dependent variable against every independent sophistication variable, 
while also running regressions with all independent sophistication variables included at the 
same time. In all regressions we also included the same set of controls: risk lover, optimism, 
high trust, gender, age, and currency. The purpose was to eliminate variation that is unrelated 
to investor sophistication. To analyze the social influence, or wisdom of the crowd effect, we 
also ran a probit regression with the binary dependent variable WOTC. Here we also included 
the same set of controls: risk lover, optimism, high trust, gender, age and currency to control 
for disturbance in the model.  
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To determine if “the crowd” would screen more in equity crowdfunding we conducted chi-
square tests to see whether the time spent to evaluate projects in equity compared to traditional 
crowdfunding significantly differ. We repeated the process trying to assess the difference 
between monitoring actions taken after investing in traditional compared to equity 
crowdfunding.  
 
One of our survey questions (question 10 concerning actions taken after funding a project in 
traditional crowdfunding) was misinterpreted by Survey Monkey, which failed to include one 
of the alternatives. To resolve this issue, we relabeled the dummy variable and only used the 
response rate of one the alternatives, those who contacted the project initiator after funding a 
project.  	  	  
3.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study  	  
An obvious reason for conducting a survey is the lack of publicly available information about 
private crowdfunding investors. If there is no publicly available data, we are simply forced to 
survey the crowd in order to gather information about their characteristics and investment 
actions. By using a survey we were able to collect a fairly large number or observation (390) 
that enabled us to test our hypothesis using standardized statistical tests. An alternative method 
would have been to use a strictly qualitative method. However, another benefit of using a 
survey is that we are able to analyze a larger sample than would have been possible if 
conducting qualitative interviews. We are therefore able to combine the benefits of collecting 
information-rich data with the benefits associated with quantitatively analyzing the data.  
 
A limit of our study is our non-randomized sample, which may complicate the generalization 
of our findings or indicate sample biases. Another limitation is the 13.3 % response rate, which 
raises a question about the 86.7 % of “the crowd” that we did not capture in our survey. To test 
the likeness of the survey and total sample we compared the mean invested amount within the 
two samples. The result shows the mean amount of our survey sample is 46 % higher than the 
total sample.  The consequence of this is that our data is mainly based on the most active and 
dedicated part of “the crowd”. The implication for our result is that the real crowd may be less 
financially dedicated and perhaps less sophisticated than the people in our survey sample. 
Another weakness is that a fraction of the mean amount funded (2-3 %) was denominated in 
other currencies than Swedish kronor. Since the fraction of foreign currency is so small and 
therefore would not substantially affect our results, we chose to ignore this fact.   
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Table 3.5: Sample Analysis – Mean Amount Comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
To further assess the robustness of our tests, we divided the expertise dummy into two separate 
dummies (experience and expertise) and ran the regressions again to see whether the 
significance of our results was affected. We did this only to the expertise dummy since this 
variable gave most significant results in our regressions. The result of the robust test was that 
the significance of our results was reduced but since we believe the combining of the two 
questions to be the correct way to measure expertise, we view this finding to be less important 
for the quality of our study as a whole.  	  
The result of our research rests on the assumption that we are able to draw conclusions about 
the potential crowd of equity crowdfunders in Sweden by surveying the existing crowd of 
traditional crowdfunders. If this assumption is faulty, we run a risk of drawing incorrect 
conclusions about the crowd of equity crowdfunders. We acknowledge and are aware of this 
potential risk and of the limitations it puts on our research. We also assume to have been able 
to correctly measure and collect information about screening and monitoring actions of the 
crowd. Additionally, we assume the crowd in our sample was able to correctly and truthfully 
answer questions of monitoring and screening actions in the hypothetical situation of equity 
crowdfunding. This may not be the case because of the lack of experience or knowledge about 
what equity is and what it means to be an equity holder, although we presume respondents 
unfamiliar with the equity concept did not complete the survey and is therefore not included in 
our data.  
 
Through our research we are able to evaluate expected and unexpected relationships among 
different variables. It is however important to remember that correlation does not imply 
causality. We acknowledge we can only test for correlations based on the data we have 
collected in our survey, and that may be other influential variables not captured in our survey. 	  
Sample Mean Amount
Survey sample 467
Total sample 320
Difference (%) 46%
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4. Research Results 	  
4.1 How sophisticated are the people in “The Crowd”? 	  
Regarding the sophistication of “the crowd”, 42% had knowledge in the same field as a project 
they funded and 49 % reported to have been better at judging the quality of the project based 
on previous experience75. We define an expert as someone who answered yes to either one of 
the questions mentioned above. The results further indicate a lack of investment experience 
since 77 % has never bought shares in an unlisted company before. As many as 85 % of the 
respondents have a university degree, which is a much higher average compared to the 
Swedish average. In 2012, only 34 % of the population had a university degree in Sweden.76 
The share of highly educated respondents (university degree, three years or more) was 64 %. 
The portion of “the crowd” classified as entrepreneurs was 47 % while only 7 % of the 
Swedish population was classified as entrepreneurs in 2012.77 The share of respondents who 
correctly answered two questions designed to capture numeracy was 44 % and 68 %. The share 
of “the crowd” that correctly answered both is 27 %. 
 
Considering other personal characteristics of the crowd, 41 % can be classified as a risk lover 
(reported either a 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5), while 37 % can be classified as neither risk taking 
or risk avers. 16 % is suspicious against other people and 13 % believe others would take 
advantage of them if given the opportunity. The question whether “the crowd” consists of 
optimists or pessimists is inconclusive. The bulk (47 %) believes the economic situation in 
Sweden will be much or marginally better in twelve months. This is in comparison to the 38 % 
who believe the economic situation in Sweden will be much or marginally worse.78  
 
Table 4.1.1: Crowd Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
When examining the motives behind the decision to fund, 49 % of the respondents replied they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
76 Ekonomifakta, 2010 "Högskoleutbildning, 25-64 år - internationellt" 
77 Ekonomifakta, 2012 "Företagare - internationellt" 
78 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
Category (% of participants)
High Education 64
Entreprenur 47
Investor 23
Expert 58
Risk Lover 41
High trust 69
Optimist 47
Numeracy 27
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liked the project and wanted to support the idea. Only 1 % had no clear motive while 25 % 
decided to fund because they liked or knew the project initiator. Furthermore, 13 % of the 
crowd reported the main motive of wanting something in return and 10 % of the respondents 
because they wanted to support the crowdfunding phenomenon. Experts are more likely to 
report the motive of wanting to receive something in return, as shown in the regression result79. 
Overall “the crowd” felt satisfied with their decision of participating in crowdfunding as 75 % 
could consider funding another project on a crowdfunding platform in the future.80  
 
Table 4.1.2: Crowd Motives 
 
 
Considering the questions about “the crowd’s” openness to equity crowdfunding, 38 % 
responded they would be more prone to finance a project if they were offered an equity stake 
while 26 % would not be affected and 11 % less prone to invest. Another interesting finding is 
that 34 % would like to give more money if offered an equity stake. If they were engaged in 
equity crowdfunding, “the crowd” would be more concerned about receiving a fair share for 
their money (36 %) instead of receiving a share as large as possible (9 %).81 Results from the 
regression show experts, entrepreneurs and investors with experience of investing in unlisted 
companies are more open to equity crowdfunding than other investor types.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Appendix 9.2.1, “Probit Regression, Investment Motive, Traditional Crowdfunding”    
80 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
81 Ibid 
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Table 4.1.3: Probit regression, Openness to Equity Crowdfunding, Traditional Crowdfunding 
 
 
4.2 Does “The Crowd” act as a sophisticated investor in Traditional 
Crowdfunding?  	  
To analyze their habits of screening we asked “the crowd” to report their actions before they 
decided to fund and how long it took them to make the decision. The results from the survey 
show only 10 % contacted the project initiator before funding and 72 % made the decision to 
fund in less than 10 minutes82. The results of the regressions show that experts take longer to 
evaluate each project while optimists are faster in their evaluation of projects83. The 
regressions also show that investors with prior experience of investing in unlisted companies 
are more likely to contact the project initiator before investing84. 
 
To determine “the crowd’s” willingness to monitor project initiators, we asked about what 
actions they would take after a decision to fund had been made. While 80 % of the respondents 
planned to follow up by contacting the project initiator or by reading up on the result on the 
Internet, 20 % did not feel any need to follow up the project.85 The result from the regression 
shows experts are more prone to monitor the owner of the project86. What is also clear is that 
entrepreneurs invest larger amounts of money in each project87. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
83 Appendix 9.2.3, “Probit Regression, Screening: Time, Traditional Crowdfunding”    
84 Appendix 9.2.4, ”Probit Regression, Screening: Contacted, Traditional Crowdfunding” 
85 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
86 Appendix 9.2.5, “Probit Regression, Monitoring Activity, Traditional Crowdfunding”    
87 Appendix 9.2.2, “Probit Regression, Mean Invested Amount, Traditional Crowdfunding”    
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Table 4.2.1: Monitoring Actions in Traditional Crowdfunding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning moral hazard, 48 % of the respondents never thought about the risk that the project 
initiator was lying or was in any other way deceitful88. A smaller share of the respondents (14 
%) is always aware of this risk. According to the regression, expertise and risk tolerance is 
positively correlated with being aware of moral hazard. On the other hand, people with high 
trust, high age and experience of entrepreneurship are unconcerned with this risk.  
 
Table 4.2.2: Probit regression, Moral Hazard, Traditional Crowdfunding 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
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From a social influence point of view we see that 35 % thought it was completely irrelevant 
that others had invested before them, while 36 % thought it was fairly relevant. However, only 
5 % of the respondents considered other members of “the crowd” to be more knowledgeable 
about the project than themselves. We also see that 50 % invested in the very beginning of the 
financing round.89 The result from the regressions show that entrepreneurs are significantly 
less likely to value the fact that others had invested before them when making their decision to 
fund a project. Entrepreneurs are also less likely to consider other members of “the crowd” to 
be more knowledgeable. These results indicate a weak social influence effect in our sample.  
 
Table 4.2.3: Probit regression, Social Influence, Traditional Crowdfunding	  
	  
4.3 Will “The Crowd” act more sophisticated in Equity Crowdfunding?  	  
The results from analyzing the responses from the survey indicate the screening process in 
equity crowdfunding differs from the screening process in traditional crowdfunding. If offered 
an equity stake 60 % would spend more than 24 hours to evaluate the project before investing. 
This is in comparison to the 72 % of respondents who would spend less than 10 minutes before 
funding in traditional crowdfunding.90  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
90 Ibid 
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Table 4.3.1: Screening Actions in Equity vs. Traditional Crowdfunding	   
 
Regarding the need to monitor, 47 % would feel the need to monitor the project in equity 
crowdfunding and 93 % would like to receive ongoing information about the project. This is in 
comparison to traditional crowdfunding where 20 % does not feel a need to monitor and only 
10 % does not feel a need to monitor the project in equity crowdfunding.91 The results from the 
regression indicate a weak correlation between expertise and monitoring actions in equity 
crowdfunding. Trust and age is however significantly negatively correlated with monitoring in 
the situation of equity crowdfunding. Older, trusting people are therefor less likely to monitor 
the entrepreneur.92  
 
Table 4.3.2: Monitoring Actions in Equity Crowdfunding 
 
  
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
92 Appendix 9.2.6, ”Probit Regression, Monitoring Activity, Equity Crowdfunding”    
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4.3.3: Probit regression, Monitoring Activity, Equity Crowdfunding 
 
The results from the Chi-square tests show the crowd will take significantly more time to 
evaluate each project in equity crowdfunding than in traditional crowdfunding93. The same is 
true regarding the different need to monitor the project initiator94. The crowd would monitor 
and screen more in equity crowdfunding compared to traditional crowdfunding.  
 
Regarding “the crowd’s” openness to governing project owners in equity crowdfunding, only 
19 % would like to be active and participate in the project95.  Experts and entrepreneurs are 
however more interested in getting involved or in other ways influence the project, although 
the results in total indicate an overall lack of interest in participating in projects.  
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Appendix 9.2.7, ”Chi-Square Test, Screening Activity, Traditional versus Equity Crowdfunding”    
94 Appendix 9.2.8, ”Chi-Square Test, Monitoring Activity, Traditional versus Equity Crowdfunding”    
95 Appendix 9.1, “Survey Results – FundedByMe” 
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Table 4.3.4: Probit regression, Governance, Equity Crowdfunding 
 
Concerning the interest of receiving a fair or as large share as possible in return, experts and 
investors with entrepreneurial and private investment experience are more prone to base their 
decision to invest on the size of the equity stake. 
 
 
Table 4.3.5: Probit regression, Size Matter, Equity Crowdfunding 
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5. Discussion 
 
HOW SOPHISTICATED ARE THE PEOPLE IN “THE CROWD”? 
 
The most protruding personal characteristics of “the crowd” are high education, expertise, 
entrepreneurial experience and a trusting personality. Additionally, we see that “the crowd” 
has a tendency towards risk taking and that a large fraction of the sample consists of investors 
with expert knowledge. Based on these facts we conclude that there are no patterns or special 
overtaking characteristics that would affect their sophistication as investors.  
 
“The crowd’s” most common motive to fund was that they believe in the project and they want 
to help realize it. It is also clear that they are prone to follow up on a project. Therefore, “the 
crowd’s” incentives and actions are similar to business angels. By combining theories with our 
empirical findings, we can draw the conclusion that crowdfunding has a potential to open up a 
market for new, sophisticated investors with an interest in being part of the realization of new 
ideas and projects.   
 
By determining a relatively high sophistication of investors, concerns of information 
asymmetry and adverse selections should be reduced. “The crowd” is older, and more educated 
than what non-believers in the equity crowdfunding model argue and they are therefore able to 
make more informed investment decisions. Equity crowdfunding, in comparison to traditional 
crowdfunding is attracting sophisticated investors, contrary to the popular view of those who 
are against this new, disruptive power. Nonetheless, the question still remains: Is a 
sophisticated crowd enough to ensure a positive future for equity crowdfunding? Building on 
fundamental venture capital theories, we argue that strong investor protection and conditions 
enabling sophisticated behavior are equally important as a having a crowd consisting of 
sophisticated investors.   
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DOES “THE CROWD” ACT SOPHISTICATED IN TRADITIONAL CROWDFUNDING?  
 
Our results show a tendency towards sophistication in traditional crowdfunding, however we 
are also able to detect some signs of unsophisticated behavior. Based on results from the 
regressions, the degree of investment sophistication is mainly driven by expertise and 
entrepreneurial experience. Experts are more prone to screen and monitor and are more 
concerned with issues of moral hazard. Entrepreneurs are more prone to receive a fair share for 
the money and people with investment experience are most prone to contact the person behind 
the project before investing, also implying sophisticated investment behavior. On the other 
hand, the majority of “the crowd” has never bought shares in an unlisted company before, and 
although experts take longer, 72 % of “the crowd” made the decision to fund in less than 10 
minutes. This finding is an example of unsophisticated investment behavior, but can easily be 
explained by “the crowd's” investment motives, which were often not about receiving a 
reward. Because of this, the incentives to carefully evaluate or monitor projects are smaller in 
traditional crowdfunding.  
 
The social influence effect is apparent if "the crowd" infers the quality of the project from the 
number of people investing before them and if they believe other members to be more 
knowledgeable than themselves. However, based on the results from the descriptive statistics, 
few investors relied on the signaling and expertise of other members, which leads us to 
conclude that "the crowd" is only marginally subjected to a social influence effect. We believe 
this to be a sign of crowd sophistication because "the crowd" achieves greater sophistication 
from it's own diversity of opinions, according to the wisdom of the crowd theory. In 
conclusion, we see no threat to the success of the traditional crowdfunding model. This model 
has proven to function even when "the crowd" does not expect or want to receive something in 
return. However, can the same can be said about the equity crowdfunding model?   
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WOULD “THE CROWD” ACT MORE SOPHISTICATED IN EQUITY CROWDFUNDING? 
	  
The results point to the conclusion that experts are more active and act more sophisticated than 
other types of investors. Experts are more open to equity crowdfunding, more open to govern 
and monitor the entrepreneur, and more concerned with moral hazard and receiving large 
shares in return. If we compare the characteristics of experts with venture capitalists and 
business angels, the results show many similarities, which leads us to the conclusion that "the 
crowd" is capable of being a good investor. 
 
The results from our tests also clearly show a significantly higher degree of screening and 
monitoring in equity crowdfunding than traditional crowdfunding. We believe this is the result 
of differing incentives in each model. If the motive is to earn a return, an investor is more 
prone to look after his or her investment. The economic incentives to screen and monitor must 
be high enough to give “the crowd” motivation to act sophisticated, to lower the potential 
information asymmetry and principal agent problems. The investments need to be large enough 
to provide incentive for the investors to act sophisticated and the size of “the crowd” also 
needs to be small enough to prevent the free riding problem. One solution is for the platforms 
to take on the responsibility of screening before the project is uploaded on the platform. 
However, it is important that the design of the platform also facilitates screening and 
monitoring by the investors themselves. The crowdfunding platforms should take on some of 
the responsibility and not hide behind general warnings to investors of potential high risk. In 
regards to contracts, platforms should not only recommend the use of legal expertise, they 
should provide it. Problems surrounding the protection of minority rights and intellectual 
property are important issues that also need to be dealt with. The rights and obligations 
concerning these topics are especially important in equity crowdfunding, because it involves 
investment by many small investors. Platforms should require that entrepreneurs provide 
answers to important questions such as competitive position, exit opportunities and predictable 
future dilutions.  
 
Although “the crowd” is capable of being a good investor, our finding poses a new question: 
Are crowdfunding platforms capable of providing good markets places? Clearly, more can be 
done to ensure the future of equity crowdfunding and the quality of equity crowdfunding 
platforms is an important factor. Who is to ensure a qualitative market place for crowdfunding 
investors in countries like Sweden where equity crowdfunding is only moderately regulated? 
We hope to see an equity crowdfunding rating system to evaluate and rate the quality of 
existing platforms and set a standard for new and upcoming platforms in the future.  
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6. Conclusion 	  
 
Our study contributes new insights about the characteristics of "the crowd" that did not 
previously exist. To return to our definition, a crowd capable of good investment consists 
of sophisticated people who act as sophisticated investors, and who are not adversely affected 
by the social influence effect.  
 
We found that experts and entrepreneurs not only have valuable experience and expert 
knowledge to contribute, but they are also capable of good investment. Overall, the crowd of 
traditional crowdfunders consists of sophisticated people who would act more sophisticated in 
equity crowdfunding. Lastly, we did not reveal clear signs of the social influence effect in our 
study, which indicates a “wise crowd” according to wisdom of the crowd theory. In 
conclusion, although a bigger crowd leads to particular problems, "the crowd" is capable of 
being a good investor. 	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7. Suggestions for future research 	  
 
Due to the wide extent of the subject of crowdfunding and the limitations of our study, further 
research on the subject would be extremely interesting.  
 
One suggestion for future research is to examine the entrepreneurs or platforms. When is the 
equity crowdfunding alternative most suitable? Who is it for? Which industries are likely to 
reap the most benefits using the equity crowdfunding model? Are crowdfunding platforms 
capable of providing good market places? It would also be interesting to see how expertise and 
other characteristics of “the crowd” develop as equity crowdfunding continues to grow. 
Another interesting suggestion for future research is to study the optimal strategy for the 
entrepreneur in the financing round. For instance, how big of a portion of the equity should the 
entrepreneur hold on to in order to be credibility and signal the quality of the project?  
 
There are still many angles from which to study the crowdfunding phenomenon through, as the 
subject is still very new. The crowdfunding model will likely be refined many times before it 
settles into a setting and structure that works. It is our understanding that this is just one of 
many attempts that is to come in the near future to try to gain a better understanding of this 
phenomenon. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1 Survey Results – FundedByMe 	  
Original language: Swedish  
 
 	  	  
Mean
1. Your age: ___ years 38
Freq. Percent Cum.
2. Sex:
a) Man 240 62% 62%
b) Woman 149 38% 100%
c) Other 1 0% 100%
3. Level of education:
a) Elementary school 4 1% 1%
b) Secondary school 54 14% 15%
b) Postsecondary school, less than 3 years 83 21% 36%
c) Postsecondary school, 3 years or more 227 58% 95%
d) PhD 22 6% 100%
4. Have you posted a project on a crowdfunding platform before? 
a) Yes, several times 4 1% 1%
b) Yes, one time 25 6% 7%
c) Never 361 93% 100%
5. Have you ever started your own business?
a) Yes, several times 63 16% 16%
b) Yes, one time 120 31% 47%
c) Never 207 53% 100%
6. Have you ever bough shares in an unlisted company? 
a) Yes, several times 41 11% 11%
b) Yes, one time 50 13% 23%
c) Never 299 77% 100%
7. Do you have expertise in the same field as the project you funded? 
a) Yes 111 28% 28%
b) No 228 58% 87%
c) In some cases 51 13% 100%
8. Do you consider yourself to have been better at judging the quality of the 
project based on you previous experience? 
a) Yes 135 35% 35%
b) No 200 51% 86%
c) In some cases  55 14% 100%
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9. What was your main motive for funding a project? (Tick one or more boxes)
a) No motive, I just wanted to try it 8 1% 1%
b) Because I like/know or have heard of the project initiator 164 25% 27%
c) Because I liked the project and wanted to support the idea 319 49% 76%
d) Because I wanted to receive something in return 84 13% 89%
e) Because I wanted to support the crowdfunding phenomenon 64 10% 99%
f) Other motive 8 1% 100%
10. What did you do before you decided to fund a project? (Tick one or more boxes)
a) Contacted the project initiator 38 10%
b) Ran a background check of the project initiator on Facebook/webpage/blog 189
c) Thoroughly read up on the project on FundedByMe 172
d) Did nothing/quickly read the project description on FundedByMe
e) Other actions 57
11. How long did it take you to decide to fund a project?
a) Less than 2 minutes 152 39% 39%
b) 10 minutes 127 33% 72%
c) 1 hour 42 11% 82%
d) 24 hours 34 9% 91%
e) More than 24 hours 35 9% 100%
12. Where in relation to the funding target was the project when you chose to fund it? 
a) In the beginning 194 50% 50%
b) In the middle 75 19% 69%
c) Close to target 35 9% 78%
d) Beyond target 6 2% 79%
e) Varying distances 42 11% 90%
f) Don’t know 38 10% 100%
13. How important was it for you to see on FundedbyMe that others also had given 
money to the project?
a) Very important, I would not have funded otherwise 21 5% 5%
b) Important, I was more prone to fund the project 93 24% 29%
c) Fairly important 139 36% 65%
d) Completely unimportant 137 35% 100%
14. Did you perceive those who supported the project before you as more 
knowledgeable about the project than you?
a) I thought they were more knowledgeable 21 5% 5%
b) I thought they were less knowledgeable 12 3% 8%
c) I never thought about it 357 92% 100%
15. In what way do you plan to follow up the project?  
a) I have or plan to follow up by contacting the project initiator 145 37% 37%
b) I have or plan to follow up by reading about/google the project 167 43% 80%
c) I feel no need to follow up the project 78 20% 100%
16. Can you imagine funding another project in the future?
a) Yes 293 75% 75%
b) Maybe 86 22% 97%
c) No 1 0% 97%
d) Don’t know 10 3% 100%
17. Have you ever thought about the risk that the project initiator is using the funds 
for another purposes than to carry out the project?
a) Yes, always 54 14% 14%
b) Sometimes 148 38% 52%
c) No, never 188 48% 100%
18. How would your decision to fund be affected if offered an ownership stake
 (equity) in the project?
a) I would be more inclined to invest in the project 147 38% 38%
b) I would not be affected 103 26% 64%
c) I would be less inclined to invest in the project 43 11% 75%
d) Don’t know 97 25% 100%
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19. Would you like to give more money in exchange for an ownership stake 
(equity) in the project?
a) Yes, the same amount of money but to more projects 24 6% 6%
b) Yes, more money but to fewer projects 67 17% 23%
c) Yes, more money to the same amount of projects 61 16% 39%
d) No 103 26% 65%
e) Don’t know 135 35% 100%
20. How much would your decision to support an equity-project depend on how 
much you get in exchange for your money?
a) A lot, I wan to receive the largest possible share in exchange for my money 36 9% 9%
b) Not a lot, I want a fair share in exchange for my money 139 36% 45%
c) Size of the share does not matter to me 88 23% 67%
d) Don’t know 127 33% 100%
21. How much time would you spend on examining the project before you decide
 to invest (in exchange for an ownership stake (equity))?
a) Less than 2 minutes 10 3% 3%
b) 10 minutes 46 12% 14%
c) 1 hour 99 25% 40%
d) 24 hours 75 19% 59%
e) More than 24 hours 160 41% 100%
22. Imagine that you have an ownership stake (equity) in a project. 
Would you like to take part of or in other ways participate in the project?
a) Yes 73 19% 19%
b) Maybe 225 58% 76%
c) No 44 11% 88%
d) Don’t know 48 12% 100%
23. Imagine that you have an ownership stake (equity) in a project. 
Would you feel a need to monitor the project?
a) Yes 182 47% 47%
b) Maybe 143 37% 83%
c) No 38 10% 93%
d) Don’t know 27 7% 100%
24. Imagine that you have an ownership stake (equity) in a project. 
What information would you like have about the progress of the project?
a) Ongoing information about the progress 364 93% 93%
b) Only information about the end result 19 5% 98%
c) No information 3 1% 99%
d) Other information 4 1% 100%
25. Do you see yourself as a person who is willing to take risks? 
1 means that you are not willing to take risks, and 5 means you are willing to take risks
a) 1 24 6% 6%
       b) 2 60 15% 22%
       c) 3 146 37% 59%
       d) 4 128 33% 92%
       e) 5 32 8% 100%
26. Generally speaking, would you say that you could trust most people or that you do 
best in being suspicious of most people? 1 means that it is better to be suspicious 
and 5 means that you can trust most people
a) 1 17 4% 4%
       b) 2 47 12% 16%
       c) 3 108 28% 44%
       d) 4 153 39% 83%
       e) 5 65 17% 100%
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27. Do you think most people would take advantage of you if they got the chance, 
or do you think that most people would treat you properly? 1 means "would take 
advantage of me" and 5 means "would treat me properly"
a) 1 14 4% 4%
       b) 2 35 9% 13%
       c) 3 120 31% 43%
       d) 4 162 42% 85%
       e) 5 59 15% 100%
28. How do you think the economic situation is in Sweden in 12 months compared
 with today? Is it...?
a) Much better 9 2% 2%
b) Somewhat better 176 45% 47%
c) Somewhat worse 120 31% 78%
d) Much worse 28 7% 85%
e) Don’t know 57 15% 100%
29. A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are 
born each day and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. 
As you know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage 
varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days in which more than 60 
percent of the babies born were boys. 
Which hospital do you think recorded more such days?
a) The big hospital 16 4% 4%
b) The small hospital 170 44% 48%
c) About the same (that is, within 5 % of each other) 204 52% 100%
30. Imagine that you toss a coin eight times. Which of the Following two outcomes 
is the most likely?
A: Head, Head, Tail, Head, Tail, Tail, Head, Head
B: Tail, Head, Tail, Head, Tail, Head, Tail, Head
a) Alternative A 49 13% 13%
b) Alternative B 77 20% 32%
c) Both are equally likely 264 68% 100%
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9.2 Regression Results and Chi-Square Test Results 	   	  
9.2.1 Probit Regression, Investment Motive, Traditional Crowdfunding   	  
9.2.2 Probit Regression, Mean Invested Amount, Traditional Crowdfunding    
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9.2.3 Probit Regression, Screening: Time, Traditional Crowdfunding 
	  	  
9.2.4 Probit Regression, Screening: Contacted, Traditional Crowdfunding 
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9.2.5 Probit Regression, Monitoring Activity, Traditional Crowdfunding 	  
	  
9.2.6 Chi-Square Test, Screening Activity, Traditional versus Equity Crowdfunding 
 	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  
9.2.7 Chi-Square Test, Monitoring Activity, Traditional versus Equity Crowdfunding	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